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Abstract
We develop a two-sector model of monopolistic competition with a diﬀerentiated inter-
mediate good and variable elasticity of technological substitution. This setting proves to be
well-suited to studying the nature and origins of external increasing returns. We disentangle
two sources of scale economies: specialization and competition. The former depends only on
how TFP varies with input diversity, while the latter is fully captured by the behavior of the
elasticity of substitution across inputs. This distinction gives rise to a full characterization of
the rich array of competition regimes in our model. The necessary and suﬃcient conditions
for each regime to occur are expressed in terms of the relationships between TFP and the
elasticity of substitution as functions of the input diversity. Moreover, we demonstrate that,
despite the folk wisdom resting on CES models, specialization economies are in general neither
necessary nor suﬃcient for external increasing returns to emerge. This highlights the profound
and non-trivial role of market competition in generating agglomeration economies, endogenous
growth, and other phenomena driven by scale economies.
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Introduction
What happens to an economy when it gets larger (say, in terms of population)? The answer
to this question is of paramount importance for understanding, for example, agglomeration
economies in new economic geography, economic growth in endogenous growth theory, the
home market eﬀect in international trade, etc. To a large extent, all these phenomena
are driven by external increasing returns to scale (EIRS), meaning that, following a given
increase in the size of the economy, the resulting increase in the aggregate output is more
than proportional. EIRS may emerge for diﬀerent reasons and they play a fundamental role
in shaping market outcomes. Specialization is among the most important sources of scale
economies: more room for the division of labor is likely to boost aggregate productivity.
On the other hand, EIRS are also inherently driven by product market competition: larger
markets lead to tougher competition across ﬁrms, for higher demand invites more ﬁrms,
which eventually results in lower prices, lower markups, and larger ﬁrms. According to
Sandmo (2011, Ch. 3), this dichotomy has been conceptualized at least as early as by Adam
Smith (1776), who was a prominent spokesman in favor of both a deeper division of labor
and freer competition. We believe, however, that the interaction between these two forces
has never been systematically studied within a uniﬁed model. Indeed, in the literature
such forces have been mainly analyzed independently from each other within two diﬀerent
families of models. While the consequences of specialization have been studied for the most
part by means of two-sector monopolistic competition models in which the ﬁnal good sector
technology displays constant elasticity of substitution (CES) across the diﬀerentiated inputs
(e.g. Ethier, 1982), the analyses of the competition eﬀect have been primarily provided
within monopolistically competitive environments with variable elasticity of substitution on
the consumer's side (Behrens and Murata, 2007; Zhelobodko et al., 2012; Bilbiie et al., 2012;
Bertoletti and Etro, 2016). 4 As a result, the joint role of specialization and competition in
generating EIRS and shaping market outcomes has till now received very little attention.
What makes the understanding of the combined eﬀect of these two forces even more
intriguing is that they need not always spur aggregate production. First, according to Kremer
(1993), more complex technologies involving a larger number of production tasks and/or more
diﬀerentiated intermediate inputs may be detrimental to manufacturing activities, e.g. due to
higher risks of failure. In other words, complexity diseconomies, as opposed to specialization
economies, may occur. Second, recent theoretical studies of market competition show that
tougher competition need not always lead to lower prices. For instance, Chen and Riordan
(2007) have proposed a model of price increasing competition, while Zhelobodko et al. (2012)
study both price-decreasing and price-increasing competition within a uniﬁed model.
In this paper, we look closer at the nature and sources of EIRS, and study how they
aﬀect the market outcome. To achieve our goal, we develop a two-sector model in which
4Both originating from Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Krugman (1979, 1981), these two approaches are
deﬁnitely related. However, as will be seen below, they diﬀer in several important respects. Bridging the
two is part of our contribution.
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the production function in the ﬁnal good sector is non-speciﬁed. In this model, the spe-
cialization/complexity eﬀect is fully captured by how TFP varies with input diversity, while
the competition eﬀect is described by the behavior of the elasticity of substitution. For this
reason, in our setting these two magnitudes are treated as fundamental primitives.
Our main ﬁndings can be summarized as follows. First, although our model generates a
rich array of equilibrium behavior modes, we provide a full characterization of the impact of
horizontal innovation5 on prices, markups, and wages. To be more precise, we state necessary
and suﬃcient conditions for competition to be (i) either price-decreasing or price-increasing,
(ii) either markup-decreasing or markup-increasing, and (iii) either wage-increasing or wage-
decreasing. The ﬁrst condition involves only TFP as a function of input diversity, the second
is based solely on the behavior of the elasticity of substitution, while the third blends both.
Thus, we clearly map the fundamental primitives of the model into a set of the various modes
of competition it generates.
Second, we endogenize the number of ﬁrms under free entry, and derive a simple nec-
essary and suﬃcient condition for EIRS in the ﬁnal good sector to occur. This condition is
also expressed in terms of the TFP and the elasticity of substitution as functions of input
diversity, and is shown to be equivalent to the wage-increasing nature of the market out-
come. Furthermore, we demonstrate that specialization economies are, in general, neither
necessary nor suﬃcient for EIRS to emerge. This unexpected result stands in a sharp con-
trast to what happens in the CES world, where the competition eﬀect vanishes because of
the lack of impact of entry on the toughness of competition. As a consequence, under the
CES specialization economies are the only source of EIRS. This explains why specialization
economies have long been viewed as the dominant factor of scale economies,6 while the im-
pact of market competition was, in this regard, deﬁnitely underestimated. On the contrary,
our result signiﬁes the non-trivial role of market competition in generating agglomeration
economies, endogenous growth, and other phenomena driven by external increasing returns.
Third, we ﬁnd that the competition eﬀect may either reinforce or weaken the impact
of the specialization eﬀect on aggregate output. This possibility has not been taken into
account by horizontal R&D-based endogenous growth models (including Benassy, 1998).
These models focus on the positive eﬀects of specialization, disregarding other possible eﬀects
(of either sign) which stem from an increase in the toughness of market competition. In our
analysis, the way in which the competition eﬀect interacts with the specialization eﬀect
depends on whether the inverse demand elasticity for the intermediate inputs is a decreasing
or an increasing function of the number of such inputs.
In addition, our approach provides a micro-foundation of the complexity externality,
which may lead to a reduction of TFP in the ﬁnal good sector in response to expanding
variety of intermediate inputs.7
5Following the literature, what we understand by horizontal innovation is entry of new intermediate input
producers.
6See Fujita and Thisse, 2013, Ch. 3, for a modern treatment.
7Examples of how this externality may work in growth theory can be found in Howitt (1999), Dalgaard
and Kreiner (2001), and Bucci (2013).
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Finally, our main results hold for any production function which satisﬁes the properties
of symmetry, strict quasi-concavity, and constant returns to scale (CRS), as well as having
well-deﬁned marginal products of inputs.
We believe that our contribution makes a further theoretical advancement compared
to recent work on monopolistic competition with variable elasticity of substitution on the
ﬁnal consumer's side, including Zhelobodko et al. (2012). Indeed, these authors only distin-
guish between price-increasing and price-decreasing competition as in their model, prices and
markups always move in the same direction in response to market size shocks. The reason
behind the deep diﬀerences in the results of the two settings, despite their formal similarity,
is as follows. The counterpart of our TFP function in Zhelobodko et al. (2012) would be the
aggregate utility measure as a function of product variety. As has been shown recently by
Dhingra and Morrow (2015), the behavior of the utility level in this type of model is crucial
for welfare analysis, but is fully unrelated to the properties of free-entry equilibrium,8 while
the elasticity of substitution yields a suﬃcient statistic for equilibrium behavior. On the con-
trary, what crucially matters for the market outcome in our model is the interplay between
the specialization/complexity eﬀect and the competition eﬀect, mathematically captured
through a condition expressed in terms of both the TFP and the elasticity of substitution.
This ultimately justiﬁes why we need two fundamental primitives instead of one.
Literature review. The pioneering work by Ethier (1982) is crucial for understanding
the role of specialization economies in generating EIRS. Ethier's paper still remains one of the
workhorse models in endogenous growth theory, as well as in urban and regional economics.
Giving full credit to this work, we ﬁnd it fair to say that the way in which the interaction
between specialization and competition may generate EIRS is deﬁnitely understudied in the
literature. We believe that the main reason for this resides in the widely used assumption that
the technology in the ﬁnal sector has CES. This assumption is appealing as it leads to major
gains in tractability. The ﬂipside is that the equilibrium markup, which may serve as a reverse
measure of the toughness of competition, remains unaﬀected by entry, or by market-size
shocks. As a consequence, the competition eﬀect is washed out in this type of model. Both
the horizontal innovation paradigm in endogenous growth theory (Grossman and Helpman,
1990; Krugman, 1990, Ch. 11; Romer, 1990; Rivera-Batiz and Romer, 1991), and the
Marshallian externalities approach, ﬁrst used by Abdel-Rahman and Fujita (1990) to study
agglomeration economies at the city level,9 are essentially based on the CES assumption. For
this reason, neither of these literatures allows us to distinguish clearly between the impacts
of specialization/complexity and toughness of competition on aggregate output and wages.
The present paper aims to ﬁll this gap.
Wage inequality has recently gained new interest in international trade studies (Amiti
and Davis, 2012; Helpman et al., 2010). In this regard, our ﬁndings suggest that this inequal-
ity may stem, at least in part, from the cross-country diﬀerences in the interaction between
8See also Benassy (1996) for an earlier contribution in the same line of inquiry.
9Duranton and Puga (2004) and, more recently, Fujita and Thisse (2013) provide extensive surveys of
this strand of literature.
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specialization and competition. Another issue that empirically motivates our theoretical
analysis is the relationship between city size and wages. The exact form of this relationship
is ambiguous, even though it is widely acknowledged by urban and regional economists that
larger cities pay, on average, higher wages. Typically a log-linear relationship implied by the
CES model is estimated with city-speciﬁc dummies being commonly used to improve the
ﬁt (Duranton, 2014). Our paper provides a microeconomic foundation for potentially more
ﬂexible empirical strategies using non-linear speciﬁcations and/or non-parametric estimation
methods.10
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3
characterizes the equilibrium for a given number of input-producing ﬁrms. We also suggest
a classiﬁcation of competitive regimes in the intermediate input sector, based on the impact
of entry on prices, markups, and wages. Section 4 deals with a free-entry equilibrium, and
studies how the interaction between the specialization/complexity eﬀect and the competition
eﬀect generates EIRS. Section 5 concludes.
The Model
The economy is composed by two vertically related sectors. The intermediate inputs sector
(sector I), produces a diﬀerentiated intermediate good under monopolistic competition.
The number of ﬁrms in this sector (I-ﬁrms) is endogenous due to free entry, while the only
production factor is labor. Workers are homogeneous, each inelastically suppling one unit of
labor. The labor market is perfectly competitive.
The ﬁnal good sector (sector F) involves a unit mass of perfectly competitive ﬁrms
(F -ﬁrms) sharing the same CRS technology, which uses varieties of the intermediate good as
inputs. The main departure of our modeling strategy from Ethier (1982) and other numerous
subsequent papers lies in working with a non-speciﬁed production function instead of the
widely used CES technology.
Sector F
The production of the homogenous ﬁnal good requires a continuum [0, n] of inputs, each
representing a speciﬁc variety of a horizontally diﬀerentiated intermediate good. All ﬁrms
operating in sector F are endowed with the same production function F :
Y = F (q), (1)
where q = (qi)i∈[0,n] is the vector of inputs used in production, while n stands for the number
10Needless to say, we acknowledge that factors other than specialization economies and market competition
also play a signiﬁcant role in determining the city size-wage gap. Moreover, this gap may be diﬀerent across
workers being heterogeneous in experience and/or ability (see, e.g., Baum-Snow and Pavan, 2012). However,
these issues are outside the scope of the present paper.
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(or, more precisely, the mass) of intermediate inputs, as well as for the number of input-
producing ﬁrms.
We make the standard assumptions about F (q). First, F (q) is concave in q, which
implies that each input exhibits a diminishing marginal product (see Appendix 1 for a
mathematical deﬁnition of marginal product under a continuum of inputs). Second, F (q)
is positive homogenous of degree 1, so that there are CRS. Finally, we focus on symmetric
production functions, i.e. such that any permutation of intermediates does not change
the ﬁnal output, Y . The reason for imposing such a symmetry, which typically holds in
monopolistic competition contexts, is to refrain from placing any ad hoc asymmetries on
sector I.
In what follows, the duality principle will prove useful. Each F -ﬁrm seeks to minimize
production costs,
min
q
nˆ
0
piqidi s.t. F (q) ≥ Y, (2)
treating the total output Y as given. The cost function C (p, Y ), deﬁned as the value function
of the cost minimization problem (2), provides a description of the technology dual to the
one based on the production function.11 Because of CRS, a well-deﬁned price index for
intermediate goods P (p) exists, which satisﬁes
C (p, Y ) = Y P (p). (3)
In the CES case, the cost function and the price index are given, respectively, by
C (p, Y ) = Y
 nˆ
0
p1−σi di
1/(1−σ) and P (p) =
 nˆ
0
p1−σi di
1/(1−σ) . (4)
To show that our approach is ﬂexible enough to encompass a broad range of the tech-
nologies used in the literature, we proceed by providing a gallery of examples.
1. CES: variations on a theme. The three assumptions just introduced (concavity,
CRS, and symmetry) are simultaneously satisﬁed by the standard CES production function:
F (q) ≡
 nˆ
0
qρi di
1/ρ , 0 < ρ < 1. (5)
At least two immediate extensions of (5) come to mind. First, the constant ρ in (5) may
be replaced by a function of n. This is the case studied by Gali (1995), who assumes that
varieties become better technological substitutes as their number increases, i.e. ρ′(n) > 0.
11Duality theory in production, for the case of a ﬁnite set of inputs, was developed in pioneering works by
Shephard (1953) and Uzawa (1964).
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Second, a multiplicative TFP term varying with n may be introduced, like in Ethier (1982)
and Benassy (1998):
F (q) = nν
 nˆ
0
qρi di
1/ρ , 0 < ρ < 1. (6)
2. Translog technologies. For a simple example of a non-CES technology satisfying
our assumptions, consider a production function given by
lnF (q) =
1
n
nˆ
0
ln qidi− α
2
 nˆ
0
(ln qi)
2di− 1
n
 nˆ
0
ln qidi
2 , (7)
which may be viewed as an inﬁnite-dimensional counterpart of the translog speciﬁcation,
which has been widely used in early empirical works on production functions estimation (for
a survey see, e.g., Kim, 1992). Another example of a tractable non-CES technology is given
by the translog cost function (Feenstra, 2003) satisfying
lnC (p, Y ) = lnY +
1
n
nˆ
0
ln pidi− β
2
 nˆ
0
(ln pi)
2di− 1
n
 nˆ
0
ln pidi
2 . (8)
3. Kimball-type production functions. Kimball (1995) represents, to the best
of our knowledge, one of the very ﬁrst (and few) macroeconomic papers where a non-CES
production technology is employed in sector F . Namely, the production function Y = F (q)
is implicitly deﬁned by means of the so-called ﬂexible aggregator:
nˆ
0
φ
( qi
Y
)
di = 1, (9)
where φ(·) is an increasing, strictly concave, and suﬃciently diﬀerentiable function.12
At this stage, a question may arise: does working with an arbitrary well-behaved CRS
technology really buy substantially more ﬂexibility compared to focusing on, say, Kimball's
aggregator (9), or another reasonably broad class of production (or cost) functions? We
believe the answer is positive, the reason being that our approach allows capturing a rich
variety of competition regimes and is ﬂexible enough to capture some empirical controver-
sies a narrower model would not.13 In Section 2.3, we give a mathematically more precise
argument in favor of our modeling strategy.
Specialization economies vs complexity diseconomies. We are now equipped to
give precise deﬁnitions for the specialization economies and complexity diseconomies. We
ﬁnd it useful, however, to preface the formal deﬁnitions valid for the general case with a
brief informal discussion based on the special case of the augmented CES technology (6).
12To guarantee that a solution to (9) does exist for any n, one should assume additionally that φ(0) ≤ 0,
while φ(∞) =∞. When φ(·) is a power function, we obtain the CES speciﬁcation as a special case of (9).
13See Table 1 and the discussion below in Section 3.2.
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In equation (6), when suﬃciently negative, ν is a measure of the magnitude of the
complexity eﬀect : a larger number of intermediate inputs being simultaneously combined
within the same production process can lead to a reduction in aggregate output (we come
back to this issue immediately below). To be more precise, complexity diseconomies are said
to occur iﬀ ν < 1−1/ρ, otherwise specialization economies take place. The logic behind these
deﬁnitions is as follows: evaluating the total output Y given by (6) at a symmetric vector of
inputs,14 we obtain Y = nν+1/ρq. The above inequalities keep track of whether Y increases
more or less than proportionately with n. The baseline case described by (5) corresponds to
ν = 0, hence the baseline CES technology always exhibits specialization economies.
In order to extend these deﬁnitions to any symmetric CRS technology, we consider the
behavior of F at a symmetric outcome, i.e. when qi = q for all i ∈ [0, n]. Denote by ϕ(n)
the level of output that can be produced when a ﬁrm uses one unit of each intermediate
input.15 Given a F -ﬁrm's total expenditure E on intermediate inputs under unit prices, the
specialization economies capture the idea that the division of labor generates productivity
gains, namely a larger variety of intermediate inputs allows to produce a larger amount of
ﬁnal output. To put this in a more formal way, note that, because of CRS, output of the ﬁnal
good equals qϕ(n) when q units of each intermediate are employed. Hence, the specialization
eﬀect takes place iﬀ
E
n
ϕ(n) >
E
k
ϕ(k), where k < n.
In other words, specialization economies occur iﬀ ϕ(n)/n increases with n, or, equiva-
lently, when the elasticity of ϕ(n) exceeds 1:
ϕ′(n)n
ϕ(n)
> 1. (10)
Otherwise output of the ﬁnal good decreases with the intermediate inputs' range. In
the latter case, we face complexity diseconomies.
TFP function. Since ϕ(n)/n captures how total output of the ﬁnal good varies with
input diversity, the total quantity of the diﬀerentiated input employed being ﬁxed, we ﬁnd
it reasonable to dub ϕ(n)/n the TFP function. Since this function will play a crucial role in
what follows, we choose to treat it as one of the two fundamental primitives of our model
(the second one to be deﬁned below). We may equivalently deﬁne specialization economies
as the situation when the TFP function increases in n.
Specialization vs complexity: a dual description. We now come to developing a
dual description of the trade-oﬀ between specialization and complexity. To do so, we observe
that when the price schedule for the intermediate inputs is symmetric, i.e. when pi = p for all
i ∈ [0, n], then the ﬁnal-good producer will purchase all inputs in equal volumes: q = Y/ϕ(n).
As a consequence, total cost equals Y pn/ϕ(n), while the price index at a symmetric outcome
14i.e. such that qi = q for all i ∈ [0, n], where q > 0 is given.
15Formally, ϕ(n) ≡ F (I[0,n]), where IS is an indicator of S ⊆ [0, n].
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boils down to
P =
n
ϕ(n)
p. (11)
Combining (11) with our deﬁnition of specialization economies, we may conclude that
the price index decreases (increases) with the range of inputs iﬀ specialization economies
(complexity diseconomies) take place.
In order to provide some intuition on the nature of the trade-oﬀ between specialization
economies and complexity diseconomies, consider the following examples. For the standard
CES technology (5), the TFP function is a power function of the form ϕ(n)/n = n1/(σ−1).
Since σ > 1, specialization economies take place. The same is true for any production
function described by the Kimball's ﬂexible aggregator (9) with φ(0) = 0, for which ϕ(n)/n =
φ−1(1/n). On the contrary, the translog production function (7) exempliﬁes complexity
diseconomies. Indeed, evaluating (7) at a symmetric input vector, we ﬁnd that ϕ(n) = 1
for all n > 0. As a consequence, (10) is violated, which means the presence of complexity
diseconomies. Finally, the dual approach allows to see that the translog cost function (8)
describes a technology which is, in a sense, a borderline case: as implied by (8) and (11),
the TFP function ϕ(n)/n is identically one. Thus, neither specialization economies nor
complexity diseconomies occur, i.e. these two forces fully balance each other.16
Proposition 1 below summarizes the main properties of all the example production
functions mentioned above.
Proposition 1.
(i) Kimball ﬂexible-aggregator technologies (9) satisfying φ(0) = 0 exhibit specialization
economies ;
(ii) the translog production function (7) generates complexity diseconomies ;
(iii) the translog cost function (8) shows exact balance between specialization economies
and complexity diseconomies.
Proof. See Appendix 2. 
This result demonstrates that non-pathological CRS technologies with diﬀerentiated
inputs exhibit versatile behavior. Proposition 1 also highlights the ﬂexibility of our approach,
which encompasses a wide variety of such technologies. In particular, our way of modeling
production technology is more general than the one proposed by Kimball (1995), for two
very diﬀerent reasons. First, because in Kimball's original framework the range of inputs
is ﬁxed, it cannot capture the impact of the specialization/complexity eﬀect on the market
outcome. Second, as implied by Proposition 1, Kimball-type production functions include
neither the augmented CES, nor the translog technologies.
16See Chen and Chu (2010, Eq. 4, p. 250) for another example of production function where the aggregate
eﬀect of variety expansion is suppressed because the specialization and complexity consequences of an increase
in the number of available varieties of intermediate inputs have the same magnitude but opposite sign.
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Sector I
There is a continuum of intermediate input producers sharing the same technology, which
exhibits increasing returns to scale. Firm i's labor requirement for producing output qi is
given by f + cqi, where f > 0 is the ﬁxed cost and c > 0 is the constant marginal production
cost. Thus, the proﬁt pii of ﬁrm i is deﬁned by pii ≡ (pi − cw)qi − f , where w is the wage
rate.
Demand for inputs. The market demand ﬁrm i faces stems from the ﬁrst-order
condition for cost minimization in the F -sector:
pi = λΦ(qi,q), (12)
where Φ(qi,q) ≡ ∂F/∂qi is the marginal product17 of input i, while λ is the Lagrange
multiplier of the ﬁrm's program (2). It follows from the envelope theorem that the value of
λ equals the marginal production cost, i.e. λ = ∂C /∂Y for all Y and p. Combining this
with (3), we obtain the following inverse demand schedule for input i:
pi
P (p)
= Φ(qi,q). (13)
Weak interactions. As stated in the introduction, market interactions between pro-
ducers of inputs are crucial for our results. For a better understanding of the nature of these
interactions, a further inquiry on the properties of the marginal products Φ(qi,q) is needed.
First, Φ(qi,q) decreases in qi, which is a straightforward implication of diminishing
marginal returns. This property means that inverse demands (13) are downward-sloping.
Second, Φ(qi,q) does not vary with individual output qj of any ﬁrm j 6= i, given that the
outputs of ﬁrm i and all the other ﬁrms (except j) remain unchanged (see Appendix 1 for
details). This second property has a far-reaching implication: input-producing ﬁrms are not
involved in truly strategic market interactions, but rather in weak interactions, meaning that
the individual impact of each ﬁrm on the demand schedules of its competitors is negligible.18
In other words, it is the aggregate behavior of ﬁrms that determines the market outcome, as
no single ﬁrm has per se enough market power to strategically manipulate the market. This
is typical in existing monopolistic competition models and is in the line with Chamberlin's
large group assumption.
For the sake of illustration, consider again the CES case. The marginal products are
given by
17Formally, the partial derivatives ∂F/∂qi are not well-deﬁned in the case of a continuum of inputs, which
may seem to be an obstacle for working within a framework where the functional F is non-speciﬁed. It turns
out, however, that putting slightly more structure on the space of input vectors q potentially available for
the ﬁnal good producers makes things work as if the marginal products were well-deﬁned. See Appendix 1
for technical details.
18See Combes et al. (2008, Ch. 3) for a thorough discussion on the nature of weak interactions in
monopolistic competition models.
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Φ(qi,q) = q
ρ−1
i A(q), A(q) ≡
 nˆ
0
qρjdj
(1−ρ)/ρ . (14)
As implied by (14), in the CES case Φ is downward-sloping in qi, while the demand
shifter A(q) is invariant to individual changes in qi.
Firm i faces the inverse demand schedule (13) and seeks to maximize its proﬁt. For-
mally, ﬁrm i's proﬁt-maximization program is given by
max
pi,qi
[(pi − cw) qi] s.t. pi = P (p)Φ(qi,q), (15)
where P (p) is the price index, which now plays the role of a market aggregate, as it includes
all the information on market prices relevant for ﬁrm i's proﬁt-maximizing pricing decisions.
In line with the idea of weak interactions, individual changes in ﬁrms' prices have a
negligible impact on P (p). In other words, each I-ﬁrm takes the value of P as given. Hence,
(15) may be restated as
max
qi
[(PΦ(qi,q)− cw) qi] , (16)
where P may now be treated as a parameter.
The ﬁrst-order condition for (16) is given by
Φ(qi,q) + qi
∂Φ
∂qi
=
cw
P
. (17)
Furthermore, given the mass n of I-ﬁrms, the quantity proﬁle q must satisfy the labor
balance condition
c
nˆ
0
qidi+ fn = L, (18)
which equates total labor supply to total labor demand.
The second-order condition, as well as technical details of possibly multiple solutions,
are discussed in Appendix 3.
The role of σ(n). The ﬁrst order condition (17) for proﬁt maximization may be recast
as
pi − cw
pi
= η(qi,q), (19)
where η is the marginal product elasticity :
η(qi,q) ≡ −∂Φ
∂qi
qi
Φ(qi,q)
. (20)
At a symmetric outcome, when pi = p and qi = q for all i ∈ [0, n], (19) boils down to
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p− cw
p
=
1
σ(n)
, (21)
where σ(n) is deﬁned by
σ(n) ≡ 1
η(qi,q)
∣∣∣∣
qj=qi ∀j∈[0,n]
. (22)
Because σ(n) is a key ingredient of our model, further comments on this function
are needed. First of all, 1/σ(n) represents the proﬁt-maximizing markup, hence σ(n) may
serve as a measure of the degree of product market competition. Thus, the behavior of
σ(n) with respect to n shows how the toughness of competition varies with ﬁrm-entry. In
particular, σ′(n) > 0 would mean that competition gets tougher when more ﬁrms enter
the market, which is probably the most plausible case, though not the only possible one.
Second, as stated by (22), σ(n) is also the inverse marginal product elasticity. In other
words, σ(n) keeps track of whether the marginal product decreases at a higher or lower
rate when the intermediate good becomes more diﬀerentiated. Finally, σ(n) also reﬂects the
degree of product diﬀerentiation. Indeed, note that in the CES case σ(n) = σ is constant,
σ being the elasticity of technological substitution across inputs. Hence, the higher σ, the
less diﬀerentiated the intermediate good is. In the non-CES case, σ(n) also yields an inverse
measure of product diﬀerentiation, which now varies with n. It can be shown that σ(n) is, in
fact, the true elasticity of technological substitution across inputs19 evaluated at a symmetric
outcome.
Before proceeding, a comment is in order on why σ(n) is independent of q. This is due
to the CRS assumption, just like in Bilbiie (2012) the analogous property of σ(n) on the
consumption side is due to the homotheticity of preferences. The marginal product Φ(qi,q)
is positive homogenous of degree zero (see Appendix 1 for a formal proof), and so is η(qi,q).
Hence, varying q in (22) evaluated at a symmetric outcome under any given n does not shift
the right-hand side of (22). As a result, σ(n) depends solely on the number of ﬁrms.
The pricing rule (21) implies that competition gets tougher (softer) in response to
entry of new I-ﬁrms when σ(n) increases (decreases). Recalling that 1/σ(n) is the proﬁt-
maximizing markup, we may rephrase this as follows: competition may be either markup-
decreasing or markup-increasing. Which of the two scenarios comes true is fully determined
by sector F 's demand for inputs. Under the CES technology proﬁt-maximizing markups are
unaﬀected by entry of new I-ﬁrms. Under the translog technologies, the proﬁt-maximizing
markups are given by:
Translog production function Translog expenditure function
1− αn 1
1+βn
Hence, both these technologies induce markup-decreasing competition. Finally, when
the production function is given by (9), we have
19As deﬁned by Nadiri (1982). See Parenti et al. (2014) for mathematical details of extending Nadiri's
deﬁnition to an environment with a continuum of inputs.
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1σ(n)
= −ξφ
′′(ξ)
φ′(ξ)
∣∣∣∣
ξ=φ−1(1/n)
. (23)
In this case, competition is markup-decreasing iﬀ the elasticity of φ′(·) is an increasing
function, otherwise it is markup-increasing.
The TFP and the elasticity of substitution as the fundamental prim-
itives of the model
We have seen that the TFP-function ϕ(n)/n and the elasticity of substitution σ(n) determine
the key properties of, respectively, the F -sector and the I-sector behavior. For this reason,
we choose to treat these two magnitudes as the fundamental primitives of the model. Such
a choice will prove to be safe, as both the taxonomy of competition regimes (Section 3) and
the necessary and suﬃcient condition for EIRS to emerge (Section 4) will be given in terms
of these two functions.
We now come back to justifying the level of generality we choose to work on (see the
discussion following equation (9)). At this level of generality, the TFP function and the
elasticity of substitution may be viewed as two independent ingredients of our approach,
in the sense that the information about one of them is generically insuﬃcient to recover
the other, which makes both of them the true primitives of our model. Focusing on a
more speciﬁc class of technologies would imply a non-trivial relationship between the two.
To illustrate this point, consider the family of production functions described by Kimball's
ﬂexible aggregator (9). In this case, the TFP function is given by
ϕ(n)
n
= −φ(ξ)
ξ
∣∣∣∣
ξ=φ−1(1/n)
, (24)
while the elasticity of substitution satisﬁes (23). As a consequence, the two fundamentals
are linked via the aggregator function φ(·), which allows unambiguously recovering one of
them from the other by means of reverse engineering (see Appendix 4 for technical details).
Moreover, Kimball's aggregator cannot capture some very simple and intuitive ways of the
elasticity of substitution's potential behavior. In particular, it can be shown (see Appendix 4)
that there exists no aggregator function φ(·), such that the resulting elasticity of substitution
were of the form σ(n) = 1 + βn, i.e. linear in n.20 These arguments illustrate how focusing
on certain classes of production functions may lead to a priori unsuspected restrictions on
the primitives of the model.
20This case corresponds to the translog cost function (8). See, e.g., Bilbiie et al. (2012), or Parenti et al.
(2014).
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Entry and the market outcomes
In this section, we focus on studying the consequences of horizontal innovation (or, equiva-
lently, the entry of new input-producing ﬁrms) on market outcomes. We fully characterize
the behavior of the economy in response to entry and highlight the fundamental role of the
relationship between the TFP function and the elasticity of substitution in shaping various
competition regimes.
Equilibrium for a given number of I-ﬁrms
Because the ﬁnal output is consumed only by workers, product market balance suggests that
Y = wL. This is possible only when the price index P equals 1. Indeed, ﬁrms' proﬁts are
given by (1− P )Y . Hence, if P < 1, each ﬁrm would supply inﬁnitely many units of Y . On
the contrary, if P > 1, total supply of the ﬁnal good is zero, since no ﬁrm is willing to start
production under negative proﬁts.
Combining P = 1 with (11) pins down the equilibrium price for the intermediate inputs
at a symmetric market conﬁguration:
p∗(n) =
ϕ(n)
n
. (25)
The intuition behind (25) is as follows. If the price for inputs exceeds ϕ(n)/n, then the
supply of the ﬁnal good, hence the demand for inputs, are equal to zero. Consequently, ﬁrms
producing intermediate goods will reduce prices in order to attract at least some demand.
If, on the contrary, prices are lower than ϕ(n)/n, the supply of Y will be inﬁnitely large,
and so will be the demands for inputs, which would lead to an increase in prices.
As implied by (25), at a symmetric equilibrium, the input price increases (decreases)
with the number of ﬁrms n in sector I when specialization economies (complexity disec-
onomies) occur (see Section 2.1). This is so because the right-hand side of (25) is exactly
the TFP function.
Equation (25) may seem puzzling, as it implies that market interactions in sector I
are fully irrelevant in determining input prices.21 As a matter of fact, on the one hand it
is absolutely true that the game between input producers depends crucially on the market
structure, and so do the proﬁt-maximizing prices when the number of ﬁrms is endogenous (see
Section 4.1 below). On the other hand, however, input-producing ﬁrms accurately anticipate
the equilibrium value of the price index, which is determined outside sector I. Namely, it
is driven to P = 1 by (i) perfect competition in sector F , and (ii) the correctness of the
intermediate ﬁrms' expectations. In other words, under the assumption that the number of
input-producing ﬁrms is given, things work as if these ﬁrms were price-takers, even though
they are actually price makers. We conclude that this property is a distinctive feature of
21Moreover, observe that (25) is fully independent of our assumption that sector I is monopolistically
competitive. This relationship, indeed, would hold under any market structure which allows for a symmetric
equilibrium (e.g., under symmetric Cournot or Bertrand oligopoly).
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models a lá Ethier (1982) compared to models of monopolistic competition a lá Dixit-Stiglitz
(1977), where the ﬁnal good is diﬀerentiated.
It is also worth mentioning that, because the labor market is perfectly competitive, the
I-ﬁrms take the wage w as given. Thus, the role of the equilibrium wage in this context is
to align proﬁt-maximizing prices with (25).
We now determine the equilibrium wages and aggregate ﬁnal output, along with the
equilibrium output per-ﬁrm. Combining (21) with (25) and P = 1 yields
w∗(n) =
1
c
σ(n)− 1
σ(n)
ϕ(n)
n
. (26)
Furthermore, plugging (26) into the product market balance Y = Lw, we obtain:
Y ∗(n) =
L
c
σ(n)− 1
σ(n)
ϕ(n)
n
, (27)
Equations (26) and (27) are important because they suggest a decomposition of equilib-
rium wages and the aggregate ﬁnal output (up to the coeﬃcients 1/c and L/c, respectively)
into the product of the competition eﬀect captured by [σ(n) − 1]/σ(n), and the specializa-
tion/complexity eﬀect captured by ϕ(n)/n. The former increases with n iﬀ σ′(n) > 0, while
the latter increases if specialization economies prevail over complexity diseconomies.
Finally, the per-ﬁrm output q∗(n) is determined from the labor balance condition (18),
which takes the form
(cq + f)n = L (28)
at a symmetric outcome. Clearly, q∗(n) = (L− fn)/(cn) always decreases with n.
The impact of entry on prices, wages, and markups
In our model, prices, wages, and markups are all endogenous. Putting together (25), (21),
and (26), we observe that the entry of new ﬁrms need not move these variables in the same
direction. In what follows, we say that competition is (i) Price-decreasing if ∂p∗/∂n < 0, and
price-increasing otherwise; (ii) Markup-decreasing if ∂[(p∗ − cw∗)/p∗]/∂n < 0, and markup-
increasing otherwise; (iii) Wage-decreasing if ∂w∗/∂n < 0, and wage-increasing otherwise.
Proposition 2 summarizes the main results of sub-section 3.1 in terms of the above
taxonomies.
Proposition 2. In the framework of the model presented, competition is (i) price-
increasing (price-decreasing) iﬀ the F-ﬁrms enjoy specialization economies (suﬀer from com-
plexity diseconomies); (ii) markup-decreasing (markup-increasing) iﬀ σ′(n) > 0 (σ′(n) < 0);
and (iii) wage-increasing (wage-decreasing) iﬀ the following inequality holds (does not hold):
ϕ′(n)n
ϕ(n)
+
σ′(n)n
σ(n)
> 1. (29)
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Proof. Claims (i) and (ii) follow, respectively, from (25) and (21). The equivalence of
dw∗/dn > 0 to (29), which is implied by (26), proves part (iii). 
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is as follows. Whether competition is price-decreasing
or price-increasing is determined solely by the properties of the TFP function ϕ(n)/n. In
contrast, the behavior of markups in response to entry can be fully characterized in terms of
the elasticity of substitution σ(n) across input varieties. Finally, both ϕ(n) and σ(n) play a
role in determining the impact of entry in sector I on the equilibrium wage. The condition
(29) states that, for the market outcome to be wage-increasing, it must be that either TFP,
or the elasticity of substitution, or both grow suﬃciently fast in n.
Two more comments are in order. First, getting a bit ahead of our story, we say here
that (29), which involves both ϕ(n) and σ(n), yields a necessary and suﬃcient condition
for EIRS to emerge (see Proposition 3 in Section 4). Hence, information about the TFP
function is insuﬃcient to detect the presence of scale economies: one also needs the elasticity
of substitution which captures the market interactions between I-ﬁrms.
Second, we believe that Proposition 2 also highlights a considerable diﬀerence between
our results and those recently obtained by Zhelobodko et al. (2012). These authors ﬁnd that
the additional entry of ﬁrms leads to a reduction or hike in markups depending solely on how
the elasticity of substitution varies with the individual consumption level. However, in their
setting markup-decreasing competition is also price-decreasing and (because labor is chosen
to be the numeraire) wage-decreasing, and vice versa. In our model, this is not necessarily
the case. To show this, we ﬁnd it worth contrasting visually our results about the impact of
I-ﬁrms' entry on prices, markups and wages across diﬀerent types of production functions.
Table 1 provides a summary for the CES and both types of translog technologies.
Translog cost CES production Translog production
function function function
Price No eﬀect ↑ ↓
Markup ↓ No eﬀect ↓
Wage ↑ ↑ No eﬀect
Table 1: The impact of entry on prices, markups and wages for diﬀerent types of production functions
Table 1 shows that under the translog cost function prices are neutral to entry, while
markups (wages) decrease (increase) in response to a larger number of ﬁrms. In the CES
case, both prices and wages increase in response to more ﬁrms entering the intermediate
input market, while the markup remains unchanged. Finally, with a translog production
function wages remain unchanged when new ﬁrms enter, while both prices and markups fall.
These ﬁndings highlight the key role of the interaction between the specialization/complexity
eﬀect and the competition eﬀect in determining the nature of market outcomes.
How can the results summarized by Proposition 2 and Table 1 be related to data?
Rosenthal and Strange (2004) provide strong empirical evidence that wages in larger cities/regions
are higher. Whether the same holds for prices is debatable. For example, Handbury and
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Weinstein (2015) describe higher prices in larger markets as a common ﬁnding, but show
that this relationship can be reversed after controlling for several measurement biases. As
seen from claim (i) of Proposition 2, our approach allows for both price-increasing and price-
decreasing competition and draws a clear-cut demarcation between the two cases in terms
of the tradeoﬀ between specialization economies and complexity diseconomies. This uniﬁ-
cation could be viewed as a theoretical reply to the inconclusive empirical ﬁndings. Finally,
much less empirical work has been done on markups. However, Bellone et al. (2015) provide
evidence that markups are lower at larger markets.
To sum up, a considerable amount of empirical work tends to suggest that larger
markets exhibit higher prices, lower markups, and higher wages. Table 1 reveals that neither
the CES production function, nor any of the two translog technologies can fully capture this
pattern. What kind of production function would be able to do that? Proposition 2 suggests
a qualiﬁed answer. According to (29), if competition is both price-increasing and markup-
decreasing, then it is also wage-increasing. Hence, any production function that exhibits
both specialization economies (nϕ′(n)/ϕ(n) > 1) and increasing elasticity of substitution
(σ′(n) > 0) generates price-increasing, markup-decreasing and wage-increasing competition.
In particular, any Kimball-type production function, such that φ(0) = 0 and the elasticity
of φ′(·) is an increasing function, does the job.
External increasing returns to scale
This section describes how the interaction between the specialization/complexity eﬀect and
the competition eﬀect generates production externalities. Hence, it plays a central role within
the whole analysis.
Free-entry equilibrium
We deﬁne a symmetric free-entry equilibrium as a vector (p∗, q∗, n∗, w∗, Y ∗), which satisﬁes
(25), (21), (26), the labor balance condition (28), and the zero proﬁt condition
(p− cw)q = wf. (30)
Equilibrium number of ﬁrms. We ﬁrst pin down the equilibrium number n∗ of
I-ﬁrms. To do so, we divide both sides of (30) by pq to obtain
p− cw
p
=
wf
pq
,
which, using pq = wf + cwq, may be restated as follows:
p− cw
p
=
f
f + cq
. (31)
In other words, at a symmetric free-entry outcome the markup of any intermediate
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ﬁrm equals the share of ﬁxed cost in ﬁrm's total production cost. This should not come as
a surprise, because it is the presence of a ﬁxed cost which generates increasing returns to
scale, hence grants market power to ﬁrms.
Combining (31) with the pricing rule (21) and the labor balance (28), we obtain:
σ(n) =
L
fn
. (32)
The equilibrium number of ﬁrms n∗ is uniquely pinned down by (32) iﬀ the elasticity of
σ(n) exceeds −1, which holds when σ(n) is either increasing or decreasing not too fast in n.
In other words, (32) has a unique solution n∗ when competition is either markup-decreasing
or not too much markup-increasing. If this is not the case, then multiple equilibria may
arise. However, since we assume that σ(n) is continuous and exceeds 1, (32) has always
at least one solution n∗ > 0, which implies that a symmetric free entry equilibrium always
exists.22
Specialization and competition under free entry. Given n∗, using (21) and (30)
yields the equilibrium ﬁrm's size:
q∗ =
f
c
· [σ(n∗)− 1]. (33)
According to (33), any (f/c)-preserving shock that generates additional entry in the
intermediate sector would lead to a hike (a reduction) in ﬁrms' size iﬀ σ(n) is an increasing
(decreasing) function of n.
Plugging (33) into the production function of sector F , we obtain the resulting aggregate
production function:
Y ∗(L) =
L
c
· σ[n
∗(L)]− 1
σ[n∗(L)]
· ϕ[n
∗(L)]
n∗(L)
, (34)
while plugging n∗ into (26) pins down the equilibrium wage w∗:
w∗ =
1
c
· σ[n
∗(L)]− 1
σ[n∗(L)]
· ϕ [n
∗(L)]
n∗(L)
. (35)
In equations (34) and (35), the term [σ(n∗)− 1]/σ(n∗) captures the competition eﬀect,
which stems from sector I . This term increases with n, hence with the population size
L, iﬀ competiton is markup-decreasing. The term ϕ(n∗(L))/n∗(L) describes the specializa-
tion/complexity eﬀect and increases with population iﬀ specialization economies take place,
which is equivalent to price-increaing competition (Proposition 2).
In order to clarify how the degree of competitive toughness may impact the aggregate
production function, we observe that total output Q∗ ≡ n∗q∗ in sector I is given by
Q [L, n∗(L)] =
L
c
·
[
1− f n
∗(L)
L
]
=
L
c
· σ(n
∗)− 1
σ(n∗)
. (36)
22In order to choose meaningful equilibria when they are multiple, we can restrict ourselves to stable
equilibria, i.e. those for which the elasticity of σ(n) evaluated at n = n∗ exceeds −1.
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Equation (36) follows from (28), (32), and (33). Using (36), the aggregate production
function (34) may be restated as follows:
Y ∗(L) =
ϕ [n∗(L)]
n∗(L)
Q [L, n∗(L)] . (37)
The ﬁrst term in (37) captures the specialization/complexity eﬀect in sector F , while
the second term keeps track of the competition eﬀect. In other words, in our framework
competition among input-producing ﬁrms aﬀects total output of the ﬁnal good through the
total amount of the intermediate input. More precisely, equations (32) and (36) imply that
Q [L, n∗(L)] increases more (less) than proportionally with L iﬀ competition is markup-
decreasing (markup-increasing). This, in turn, leads to competition generating a tendency
toward external increasing (decreasing) returns to scale in sector F . Compared to the stan-
dard CES model (where Q is readily veriﬁed to be exactly proportional to L, so that a
competition eﬀect cannot be taken into account), in the general case that we are analyzing
there are two sources of EIRS: the specialization/complexity eﬀect and the competition eﬀect.
This explains why using a CES production function may cause some limitations in var-
ious economic contexts. To see this in more detail, consider again equations (34) and (35)
above. These two equations are basically the same and diﬀer just by a constant term (L/c
and 1/c , respectively). When specialization economies take place, the term ϕ[n∗(L)]/n∗(L)
increases with n∗. As for the competition eﬀect, [σ(n∗) − 1]/σ(n∗), it rises with n∗ under
markup-decreasing competition, and falls otherwise. Therefore, solely in the former case
(markup-decreasing competition) is the specialization eﬀect on both aggregate output and
wages reinforced by the competition eﬀect. This is no longer true when competition is
markup-increasing: in this case, the specialization eﬀect would be weakened by the compe-
tition eﬀect stemming from a larger mass of ﬁrms entering the intermediate sector. Notice
that, if the production function were CES, then the term [σ(n∗) − 1]/σ(n∗), appearing in
both (34) and (35), would be constant. As a consequence, the specialization eﬀect would be
the only source of external increasing returns to scale in the ﬁnal good sector.
How scale economies emerge
We are now equipped to characterize the comparative statics of the free-entry equilibrium
with respect to the population size L. Our main interest in this exercise is to reveal how
aggregate output varies with L, namely how EIRS in the F -sector emerge.
Under a positive shock in L, the left-hand side of equation (32) remains unchanged,
while the right-hand side is shifted downwards. As a consequence, the equilibrium mass n∗
of ﬁrms increases with L whenever the equilibrium is stable (see Section 4.1). Combining
this with (34), we ﬁnd that at equilibrium the average product of labor, Y ∗(L)/L, increases
with L iﬀ [σ(n)− 1]ϕ(n)/n is an increasing function of n, or, equivalently, iﬀ competition is
wage-increasing.
We can now state the key result of our paper.
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Proposition 3. External increasing returns to scale take place iﬀ (29) holds, or,
equivalently, iﬀ competition is wage-increasing.
As discussed in Section 3, what renders competition wage-increasing or wage-decreasing
in our model is the interplay between the competition eﬀect and the specialization/complexity
eﬀect. Therefore, Proposition 3 stresses the importance of the interaction between the two
eﬀects in generating Marshallian externalities. Indeed, by comparing (29) with the necessary
and suﬃcient condition (10) for specialization economies to arise, we ﬁnd that that the for-
mer contains an additional term, nσ′(n)/σ(n), which captures the competition eﬀect and is
missing in (10). Hence, (29) and (10) coincide iﬀ σ(n) is constant, which corresponds to the
standard CES case. This explains why both the endogenous growth and the agglomeration
economics literatures have generally explained the emergence of EIRS by appealing solely to
the presence of specialization economies. Meanwhile, the role of market interactions among
ﬁrms in this process has been largely (and perhaps undeservedly) neglected.
As for the relationship between n∗ and L, our analysis shows that n∗ increases less
(more) than proportionally to L iﬀ competition is markup-decreasing (markup-increasing).
Combining this with (34) yields the following result.
Proposition 4. Compared to the CES case, markup-decreasing competition damps
the specialization eﬀect, but simultaneously triggers a positive competition eﬀect. Under
markup-increasing competition, the situation is reversed.
Table 2 summarizes in a compact way our results about the roles that market-size
and the interaction between the specialization eﬀect and the competition eﬀect play in de-
termining the equilibrium market-outcome under markup-decreasing and markup-increasing
competition:
σ′(n) > 0 σ′(n) < 0
n∗
increases less than proportionally increases more than proportionally
in response to an increase in L in response to an increase in L
Y ∗, w∗
specialization eﬀect weakened, specialization eﬀect reinforced,
positive competition eﬀect negative competition eﬀect
Table 2: The impact of market-size and the interplay between the competition and the specialization
eﬀects in determining the equilibrium market-outcome: markup-decreasing vs markup-increasing
competition
Examples
For a better illustration of the role played by the interaction between the specialization/complexity
eﬀect and the toughness of competition in generating EIRS, consider the following examples.
CES production function. In this case, equation (32) is linear, i.e. the number of
ﬁrms is proportional to total labor supply L. Hence, the competition eﬀect is washed out,
and the specialization eﬀect is the only source of external increasing returns. The aggregate
production function is given by
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Y ∗(L) = AL1/(1−ρ), A ≡ ρ
c
(
1− ρ
f
)ρ/(1−ρ)
.
Translog cost function. Combining (8) with (32) yields βn2+n = L/f , which implies
n∗ =
(√
1 + 4L/f − 1
)
/(2β). In this case, the number of ﬁrms grows proportionally to
√
L.
This is because, unlike the CES case, competition is tougher in a larger market. Furthermore,
as stated by part (iii) of Proposition 1, complexity diseconomies and specialization economies
exactly oﬀset each other. Therefore, the competition eﬀect becomes the main force shaping
the resulting aggregate production function which is given by
Y ∗(L) =
f
4βc
(√
1 + 4L/f − 1
)2
. (38)
Equation (38) suggests that the average product of labor Y ∗(L)/L increases in L for all
L ≥ 0. In other words, external increasing returns take place. However, the source of these
increasing returns is radically diﬀerent from that in the CES case. Namely, agglomeration
economies stem here solely from market interactions between ﬁrms, while in the classical
CES-based models they are generated entirely by technological externalities embodied in
the specialization/complexity tradeoﬀ.
Translog production function. In this case, the competition eﬀect is even stronger.
Indeed, as implied by (7), (32) takes the form: 1 − αn = fn/L. Hence, n∗ = L/(αL + f),
which implies that the equilibrium mass of ﬁrms is bounded from above by 1/α. In other
words, even when population L grows unboundedly, the number of ﬁrms the market invites to
operate remains limited due to very tough competition. The aggregate production function
is given by
Y ∗(L) =
α
c
L. (39)
Thus, in the case of the translog production function, the resulting technology exhibits
constant returns to scale. This result is in line with Proposition 3: EIRS arise only when
competition is wage-decreasing, while under the translog production function entry has no
impact on wages (see Table 1 in Section 3.2).
A micro-foundation for an S-shaped production function. Finally, we pro-
vide a simple micro-foundation for an S-shaped aggregate production function, which has
been widely used in growth theory and development economics, especially in the analysis
of poverty traps.23 In this regard, consider a Kimball-type technology associated with the
aggregator function φ(ξ) ≡ aξρ − b, where a and b are positive constants, while 0 < ρ < 1.
Here, a can serve as a measure of overall TFP, while b shows the strength of the complexity
externality. Solving in closed form for the production function, we obtain
23See Skiba (1978), and, more recently, Azariadis and Stachurski (2005), as well as Banerjee and Duﬂo
(2005), for examples on the possible consequences of using S-shaped production functions within these two
branches of economic literature. The idea dates back at least to Shapley and Shubik (1967).
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F (q) = A(n)
 nˆ
0
qρi di
1/ρ , A(n) ≡ ( a
1 + bn
)1/ρ
. (40)
The TFP function underlying (40) is given by
ϕ(n)
n
=
1
n
(
an
1 + bn
)1/ρ
, (41)
while the elasticity of substitution across inputs is constant and is given by σ = 1/(1 − ρ),
just like in the standard CES case. Using (41), it is readily veriﬁed that ϕ(n)/n increases in
the input diversity n for all n < 1/(ρb) and decreases otherwise. Hence, the TFP function is
bell-shaped, meaning that specialization economies occur when the intermediate input is not
too much diﬀerentiated, otherwise complexity diseconomies prevail.
The resulting aggregate production function Y ∗(L) reads as
Y ∗(L) =
f
1− ρ
(
L
L+ af/(1− ρ)
)1/ρ
. (42)
According to (42), increasing returns to scale arise when L is suﬃciently small; other-
wise, decreasing returns to scale occur.
Concluding remarks
Using a two-sector model with a perfectly competitive ﬁnal good sector, a monopolisti-
cally competitive intermediate input sector and variable elasticity of technological substi-
tution across intermediate inputs, we have singled out two sources of EIRS: the specializa-
tion/complexity eﬀect and the competition eﬀect. The former is generated within the ﬁnal
good sector and shows how employing more varieties of intermediate inputs fosters/deters
the production of the ﬁnal good, while the latter stems from the market interactions among
ﬁrms within the intermediate input sector. The market outcome is determined by the com-
bined behavior of the TFP and the elasticity of substitution, which are both functions of
the input diversity. In other words, the interplay between the competition eﬀect and the
specialization/complexity eﬀect plays a key role in shaping the equilibrium properties.
We have fully characterized market behavior in terms of the relationships between the
two above eﬀects. This characterization has been useful in clarifying the origins of external
increasing returns. In particular, we have shown that, due to the interference of a non-trivial
competition eﬀect, the presence of specialization economies is neither necessary nor suﬃcient
for scale economies to emerge. This result highlights the limitations of the CES monopolistic
competition approach to modeling the scale externalities, which overlooks the relevance of
the competition eﬀect, as the level of market power does not vary with the number of ﬁrms.
Therefore, our analysis points to the need for more work on the role of market competition
in shaping agglomeration economies, endogenous growth and other economic phenomena
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driven by scale eﬀects. Finally, we argue that our theoretical ﬁndings are in line with recent
empirical evidence on the behavior of prices, markups and wages with respect to the size of
the economy.
A last remark is in order. Our decomposition of scale economies into two components
has been done at the theoretical level. However, given the growing amount of applied research
aimed at estimating the impacts of TFP shocks and variable markups on the economy, we
believe that a similar exercise can also be done empirically. Using our model as a basic
setting for structural econometrics would require extensions to the cases of heterogeneous
ﬁrms, multiple ﬁnal-good sectors, and probably also imperfect market structures alternative
to monopolistic competition, where one can build on d'Aspremont et al. (1996, 2007),
Atkeson and Burstein (2008), and Amiti et al. (2016). We leave these tasks for future
research.
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Appendices
Appendix 1. Marginal products under a continuum of inputs
We restrict our attention to such input vectors q that have a ﬁnite second moment, i.e.´ n
0
q2i di < ∞. In other words, q ∈ L2 ([0, n]). Intuitively, this assumption allows mean and
variance of the input vector to be well-deﬁned.
We also assume Frechet-diﬀerentiability, i.e. we postulate that there exists a functional
Φ : R+ × L2 → R+, such that
F (q + h) = F (q) +
nˆ
0
Φ(qi,q)hidi+ ◦ (||h||2) for all q,h ∈ L2. (43)
In (43), || · ||2 stands for the L2-norm, i.e. ||h||2 ≡
√´ n
0
h2idi, whereas Φ(qi,q) is the
marginal product of intermediate input i. Concavity of F implies that Φ is decreasing in qi.
Lemma. Let F : L2 → R+ be a Frechet-diﬀerentiable functional, which is positive
homogeneous of degree 1. Then (i) Φ(qi,q) is positive homogenous of degree zero in (qi,q),
and (ii) the Euler's identity
F (q) =
nˆ
0
qiΦ(qi,q)di, (44)
holds.
Proof. To prove (i), rewrite (43) as follows:
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F (tq + th) = F (tq) +
nˆ
0
Φ(tqi, tq)thidi+ ◦ (t||h||2) for all q,h ∈ L2, t ∈ R+. (45)
Dividing both sides of (45) by t and using homogeneity of F , we obtain
F (q + h) = F (q) +
nˆ
0
Φ(tqi, tq)hidi+ ◦ (||h||2) . (46)
Combining (43) with (46), we ﬁnd that φ(tqi, tq) is a Frechet derivative of F computed at
q for any t > 0. By uniqueness of Frechet derivative, φ(tqi, tq) must be independent of t,
which proves part (i) of the Lemma.
To prove part (ii), note that (43) implies the following identity:
F ((t+ τ)q)− F (tq)
τ
=
nˆ
0
Φ(tqi, tq)qidi+
◦(τ)
τ
for all τ ∈ R. (47)
Using homogeneity of F and Φ, we obtain (44) as the limiting case of (47) under τ → 0.
Q.E.D.
Appendix 2. Proof of Proposition 1.
(i) If a production function satisﬁes (9), we have
ϕ(n)
n
=
1/n
φ−1(1/n)
. (48)
Because φ(·) is increasing and concave, it must be that φ−1(·) is increasing and convex.
If φ(0) = 0, then the elasticity of φ−1(·) always exceeds 1. As a consequence, ϕ(n)/n
decreases in 1/n and increases with n.
When φ(0) 6= 0, the above argument is no longer valid. Indeed, as implied by (41),
production function given by (40) provides a counterexample. This completes the proof of
(i).
(ii)-(iii). As shown in Section 2.1, under (7) we have ϕ(n) = 1, while (8) yields ϕ(n) = n
for all n > 0. Combining this with the deﬁnition (10) of specialization economies completes
the proof. 
Appendix 3. SOC and no multiplicity of equilibria
Observe that the left-hand side of (17) is positive homogenous of degree zero. This implies
that the solution of (17) cannot be unique. Indeed, multiplying a solution of (17) by a
constant yields another solution. The proper equilibrium is pinned down by the labor
balance condition (18).
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To guarantee that equation (17) is compatible with proﬁt-maximizing behavior by
ﬁrms, the second-order condition must hold, which amounts to assuming that the real oper-
ating proﬁt [Φ(qi,q)− cw/P ] qi of ﬁrm i is strictly quasi-concave in qi for all q.
In order to ensure that a continuum of asymmetric Nash equilibria in the ﬁrms'
quantity-setting game does not arise, we introduce a stronger assumption: the left-hand
side of (17) is decreasing in qi for any q. Imposing this condition is equivalent to assuming
that the operating proﬁt of each ﬁrm is strictly concave in its output. This assumption holds
for the CES and, more generally, for any production function of the type (9) such that
−φ
′′′(ξ)
φ′′(ξ)
ξ < 2 for all ξ > 0.
This rules out the possibility of asymmetric equilibria because (17) has a unique solu-
tion q∗i (q), which is the same for all ﬁrms i ∈ [0, n]. See, e.g., Gorn et al. (2012) for a formal
treatment of multiple asymmetric equilibria in a monopolistically competitive setting.
Appendix 4. The relationships between ϕ(n) and σ(n) within Kimball
family
We show here how focusing on the family of Kimball's ﬂexible aggregator technoilogies (9)
may generate ﬁrm, hence potentially restrictive, linkages between the two fundamentals,
ϕ(n) and σ(n). Then, the elasticity σ(n) of substitution across diﬀerentiated inputs can be
uniquely pinned down if one knows the TFP function ϕ(n)/n. Indeed, observe that (24)
implies
φ(ξ) =
1
ϕ−1(1/ξ)
.
Plugging φ(·) into (23) yields σ(n) as a single-valued function of n.
In order to recover the TFP function knowing σ(n), we proceed as follows. Using (23)
and observing that n = 1/φ(ξ), we ﬁnd that a candidate aggregator function φ(·) must be
an increasing and concave solution to the following second-order ODE:
d2φ
dξ2
= −1
ξ
dφ
dξ
· 1
σ(1/φ)
. (49)
Whether (49) has a solution satisfying the desired properties for a given function σ(·)
is a priori unclear. The following result illustrates the restrictions imposed by focusing on
Kimball's family of technologies.
Claim. There exists no increasing and concave aggregator function φ(·), under which
(9) would generate a linearly increasing elasticity of substitution σ(n) = 1 + βn with β > 0.
Proof. Assume the contrary. Then, using σ(n) = 1 + βn and (49), a candidate
aggregator function φ(·) must be an increasing and concave solution to
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d2φ
dξ2
= −1
ξ
dφ
dξ
· φ
φ+ β
. (50)
The general solution of (50) is deﬁned as a solution to
ξ = A exp
{
−exp(a)
β
· Ei [a− ln(β + φ)]
}
, (51)
where A > 0 and a ∈ R are integration constants, while Ei(·) is the exponential integral
deﬁned by
Ei(x) ≡
∞ˆ
1
exp(−xz)
z
dz.
It is readily veriﬁed that the right-hand side of (51) is a decreasing function of φ for
any given values of A and a. As a consequence, each solution φ(ξ) to (50) is a decreasing
function, hence it cannot serve as an aggregator function in (9). 
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